Just so everyone knows, the Supremes (the spineless majority, not the brave minority) did not address my arguments, they ignored them (after I pleaded with them four times not to).
http://www.pot-tv.net/archive/series/pottvseries-109-0.htmlThey're main two arguements were 1) "Up to Parliament" (after how many years of ignoring Le Dain?) and 2) "Vulnerable Groups".
As you can see from the following, I addressed these arguments throughout my speech and in my closing remarks:
REPLY OF THE APPELLANT, David Malmo-Levine, Appearing in Person
MR. DAVID MALMO-LEVINE: Well, I said, at the onset of today, that my
purpose here was to try to shift the debate from whether the harms are
trivial, insignificant, to whether the harms are mitigatable and reducible.
And, apart from perhaps Mr. Conroy, I feel that I have failed in that task.
Nobody here has asked me any questions about harm reduction, either to
verify their existence or to challenge their existence and -
- (voice over voice - off mike) -
CHIEF JUSTICE McLACHLIN: Perhaps we're all convinced.
MR. DAVID MALMO-LEVINE: Well, I hope so. I really do.
- (laughter) -
Mr. Frankel, though, has a responsibility, and that is that he - he should
not mis-characterize my argument as: there's not enough harm. It's not a
matter of enough or - or amount of harm. It's whether the harms are
inherent or whether they are mitigatable. And that applies to those
vulnerable groups, as well.
I think that Mr. Conroy made an error when he said that I would prohibit
these groups from my club. I wouldn't and I didn't. I suggest that the
vulnerable groups, the chronic users, the mentally ill, the pregnant
mothers, and the immature youth, are the ones that need harm reduction the
most.
They need to be protected by the black market harms more than any other
people. And we can address all the concerns that you might have about these
vulnerable groups through harm reduction strategies, harm reduction methods,
and the evidence that - that you heard today.
For example, I started smoking pot when I was fourteen. The black
market was what threatened me. Getting knifed or - or meeting people
who were selling other things. All that. The separation of the hard and
soft drug -
I'm sorry, do you have a question?
CHIEF JUSTICE McLACHLIN: What is your point?
MR. DAVID MALMO-LEVINE: Oh, I'm sorry.
The separation of the hard and soft drug market is what the Dutch claim as
their glaring success. And that is the kinds of harms I wish to protect
vulnerable groups, especially youths in Canada, from.
And - and I believe that a parental permission policy would address all the
concerns that parents and police might have and - and would encourage
dialogue and discussion between parents and youths and the homework
would get done, the lawns would be mowed if some sort of - and,
again, this could fall into s.1. Or - or, say, the mentally ill.
Now, it is my understanding that the schizophrenics and other people at
the compassion club have discovered that, with proper strain selection,
specifically avoiding setivas and focussing mainly on indicas and hashish,
they can avoid some of the unpleasant experiences that have been
characterized as inherent with schizophrenics using cannabis.
A lot of these studies and a lot of the evidence, that they're basing this
on, is based on marinol, which is just THC and, like I said, the setivas,
which are mostly THC, tend to wing you out, make you a little bit flighty
and - and not good for schizophrenia, but the indicas and the hashish are.
And a lot of schizophrenics and a lot of other people, who are using
cannabis for mental health or mental illness, are dependent upon cannabis
and, if they're using it properly, there's no evidence of any harm to them.
Or the pregnant mothers. Do you know that cannabis has been used, from time
immemorial, for nausea, lack of appetite and sleep, relaxation, and
relaxation of the birth canal muscles so there's no tearing? And perhaps
cannabis is the number one medicine because of its lack of toxicity for
pregnant mothers. So that should be considered.
And I myself am a chronic user. I fall under the definition of chronic
user found in the Senate, over a gram a day. But I think that the
quality of the cannabis, the organics, or whether it's chemically
fertilized or organically fertilized, and the dose levels, the setting,
these are all factors that differentiate chronic abuse from just chronic
use, like, say, a chronic caffeine user might properly use coffee, but use
it every day.
And - and all of these things that they blame cannabis for, point their
fingers at cannabis harms, would be true for coffee if it was made suddenly
illegal. If - if it was dealt by dark-skinned people a hundred years
ago, perhaps it would be illegal today.
Because, really, that's the only thing I can see that the opiates in
cannabis and coca have in common. Not that they were more dangerous than
the pharmaceuticals or tobacco or alcohol a hundred years ago. They were
distributed by dark-skinned people and there is some evidence of racism in
the creation and loss.
Now, Justice Curtis originally said: Show us what you've got. And I -
I - we did, which was all harms are mitigatable, which is, again, found in
the appeal book, at 106 and 186.
But the lower court ignored this evidence by claiming that there was no
harm principle. The British Columbia Court of Appeal ignored this evidence
by claiming: Well, you can't deal with dealing unless you first deal with
using.
So, again, I beg this Court: Don't invent excuses to ignore this huge pile
of evidence on harm reduction. Incorporate the harm reduction evidence into
your decisions on harm and - and - and realize that we're not -
Okay, I guess my time is up, but we're not asking, or at least this
Appellant is not asking, for the right of intoxication or the right to smoke
marijuana. No.
This Appellant is asking for the right to do any harmless activity, any
harm - any activity that the state has been given lots of opportunity to
provide evidence of inherent harm and has failed, year after year, decade
after decade, generation after generation. That's what we're arguing for,
the right to do any harmless activities.
CHIEF JUSTICE McLACHLIN: Thank you.
- (voice over voice - off mike) -
MR. JUSTICE BINNIE: Could you just tell me, in your earlier submission,
you made of number of references to the Loubec decision. I don't find what
you're referring to.
MR. DAVID MALMO-LEVINE: Yes, it's in the Caine's book of miscellaneous
authorities. I do believe that I gave a citation for it. I'll find it
again for you. The Loubec decision is very important because,
really -
MR. JUSTICE BINNIE: No, no -
MR. DAVID MALMO-LEVINE: - both the harm principle and equality -
MR. JUSTICE BINNIE: - I heard the submissions.
MR. DAVID MALMO-LEVINE: Alright.
MR. JUSTICE BINNIE: I just wanted to find it.
MR. DAVID MALMO-LEVINE: I'll find you - I'll find you the citation, sure.
MR. JUSTICE BINNIE: Well, it's in Caine's book of authorities, isn't it?
MR. DAVID MALMO-LEVINE: One moment, please.
CHIEF JUSTICE McLACHLIN: We can find it, if it is -
MR. JUSTICE BINNIE: We will find it if it's in Caine's book.
MR. DAVID MALMO-LEVINE: It is in the Caine miscellaneous reports. I did
mention the exact place that it was found. Loubec, Loubec. John, do you
have it handy?
MR. JUSTICE BINNIE: It's alright. You've told us where it is, so I'll find
it.
MR. DAVID MALMO-LEVINE: It will just take one second. Here we go. Oh,
here. Caine, miscellaneous authorities, tab 1, pages 8 to 10, 15 and 31.
I do again want to stress that it was thrown out at a higher court for the
wrong reasons, a misidentification of state interests.
We're not concerned in Canada with reducing use levels. We're only concerned
with reducing abuse levels and I believe that education could probably -
even if use levels go up, abuse levels might go down, if we educate.
CHIEF JUSTICE McLACHLIN: Thank you, Mr. Malmo-Levine.
REPLY OF THE APPELLANT, Victor Eugene Caine, John W. Conroy, Q.C.
MR. JOHN W. CONROY: No mental deterioration there, in my submission.
Chronic user, living, breathing example.
********************
Part of a transcript of Appeal Hearing in Supreme Court of Canada May 6th, 2003 (Word document)
http://www.johnconroy.com/rvcaine.htmlOnly three judges seemed like they were listening. Here are some quotes from the astute three:
Justice Louise Arbour:
266 If there remained any doubt as to whether the harms associated with
marihuana use justified the state in using imprisonment as a sanction
against its possession, this doubt disappears when the harms caused by the
prohibition are put in the balance. The record shows and the trial judges
found that the prohibition of simple possession of marihuana attempts to
prevent a low quantum of harm to society at a very high cost. A "negligible"
burden on the health care and welfare systems, coupled with the many
significant negative effects of the prohibition, cannot be said to amount to
more than little or no reasoned risk of harm to society. I thus conclude
that s. 3(1) and (2) of the Narcotic Control Act, as it prohibits the
possession of marihuana for personal use under threat of imprisonment,
violates the right of the appellants to liberty in a manner that is not in
accordance with the harm principle, a principle of fundamental justice,
contrary to s. 7 of the Charter.
276 The constitutional questions in the Caine appeal should be answered
as follows:
(1) Does prohibiting possession of Cannabis (marihuana) for personal
use under s. 3(1) of the Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1, by
reason of the inclusion of this substance in s. 3 of the Schedule to the Act
(now s. 1, Schedule II, Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c.
19), infringe s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
Answer: Yes.
(2)If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, is the
infringement justified under s. 1 of the Charter?
Answer: No.
===
Justice Louis LeBel:
280 In my mind, it cannot be denied that marihuana can cause problems of
varying nature and severity to some people or to groups of them.
Nevertheless, the harm its consumption may cause seems rather mild on the
evidence we have. In contrast, the harm and the problems connected with the
form of criminalization chosen by Parliament seem plain and important. Few
people appear to be jailed for simple possession but the law remains on the
books. The reluctance to enforce it to the extent of actually jailing people
for the offence of simple possession seems consistent with the perception
that the law, as it stands, amounts to some sort of legislative overreach to
the apprehended problems associated with marihuana consumption. Moreover,
besides the availability of jail as a punishment, the enforcement of the law
has tarred hundreds of thousands of Canadians with the stigma of a criminal
record. They have had to bear the burden of the consequences of such
criminal records as Arbour J. points out. The fundamental liberty interest
has been infringed by the adoption and implementation of a legislative
response which is disproportionate to the societal problems at issue. It is
thus arbitrary and in breach of s. 7 of the Charter. For these reasons, I
agree with Arbour J. that fundamental rights are at stake, that they were
breached, and that this Court must intervene as part of its duty under the
Constitution to uphold the fundamental principles of our constitutional
order.
===
Justice Marie Deschamps:
284 I agree with the majority of this Court on the arguments relating to
the protection of lifestyle and the shifting purpose of the Act. I will
limit my comments to the arguments concerning the harm principle and the
arbitrary nature of the legislation. The latter argument leads me to
conclude that the inclusion of cannabis in the schedule to the Narcotic
Control Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N--1 (rep. & repl. S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 94)
infringes the appellants' right to liberty.
289 The criminal law is one of the most aggressive weapons the state has
to enforce its dictates. This weapon must be wielded with great care. The
courts must intervene when an enactment violates constitutional guarantees.
More specifically, and without repeating the detailed comments of my
colleagues, the courts must act when the right to liberty is infringed
without regard for the principles of fundamental justice. In the present
case, I believe Parliament has exercised its power arbitrarily.
290 When the state prohibits socially neutral conduct, that is, conduct
that causes no harm, that is not immoral and upon which there is no societal
consensus as to its blameworthiness, it cannot do so without raising a
problem of legitimacy and, consequently, losing credibility. Citizens become
inclined not to take the criminal justice system seriously and lose
confidence in the administration of justice. Judges become reluctant to
impose the sanctions attached to such laws.
291 There are several basic tenets of criminal law that can be used
to measure the arbitrariness of a prohibition. I shall rely on three of
these principles here: the need for the state to protect society from harm,
the availability of tools other than criminal law that could adequately
control the conduct and the proportionality of the measure to the problem in
question.
293 As mentioned by the majority, the reasons for adding marihuana to
the schedule to the Narcotic Control Act are nebulous, at best. The
historical background outlined by the trial judge in the case of the
appellant Caine clearly shows that Parliament's decision was made at a time
when a climate of irrational fear predominated, owing to a campaign led by
Edmonton magistrate Emily Murphy, who claimed that marihuana caused users to
lose their minds, along with all sense of moral responsibility, becoming
maniacs capable of murder and many other acts of cruelty.
294 Fortunately, the consequences of marihuana use are nothing like
those described at that time. Although I do not accept the harm principle as
an independent principle, I believe that the need for the state to protect
society from harm plays an active role in any assessment of the
arbitrariness of legislation.
295 The inherent risks of marihuana use, apart from those related to
the operation of vehicles and the impact on public health care and social
assistance systems, affect only the users themselves. These risks can be
situated on a spectrum, ranging from no risk for occasional users to more
significant risks for frequent users and vulnerable groups. On the whole,
with a few exceptions, moderate use of marihuana is harmless. Thus, it seems
doubtful that it is appropriate to classify marihuana consumption as conduct
giving rise to a legitimate use of the criminal law in light of the Charter.
297 The minimal harm caused by marihuana does not fit squarely
within the categories of conduct usually kept in check by the criminal law.
298 Only three groups are traditionally identified as requiring state
intervention for their protection: young persons, pregnant women and certain
people with medical conditions. This line of reasoning does not have to be
pushed very far before it becomes obvious that criminal law is not society's
preferred means of controlling the conduct of these groups. The use of
imprisonment and all the other aspects of the criminal justice system,
including the imposition of a criminal record, to suppress conduct that
causes little harm to moderate users or to control high-risk groups for whom
the effectiveness of deterrence or correction is highly dubious and seems to
me out of keeping with Canadian society's standards of justice.
299 This brings me to the third factor, proportionality. The harmful
effects of marihuana use have already been discussed and are highly
debatable. The harm caused by its prohibition, however, is clear and
significant. For the details, I refer back once again to the effects listed
by Arbour J. (para. 200). A balancing of these two factors yields the result
that the harm caused by prohibiting marihuana is fundamentally
disproportionate to the problems created by its use that the state seeks to
suppress.
301 The harm caused by using the criminal law to punish the simple use
of marihuana far outweighs the benefits that its prohibition can bring.
LeBel J. notes that the fact that jail sentences are rarely imposed
illustrates the perception of judges that imprisonment is not a sanction
that befits the inherent dangers of using marihuana. In the case of the
appellant Caine, Howard J. also observed that the prohibition had brought
the law into disrepute in the eyes of over one million people. These are
exactly the kinds of reactions that are indicative of the arbitrariness of
the impugned provisions. As I have already mentioned, and as Howard J.
observed, when the state prohibits socially neutral conduct, it exposes
itself to the risk of eroding its credibility.
302 Canadian society is changing. Its knowledge base is growing, and its
morals are evolving. Even if it was once the case, and in my view it never
was, the prohibition against cannabis is no longer defensible. My analysis
leads me to conclude that the little harm caused by marihuana casts doubt on
the appropriateness of state intervention in this case. When I weigh the
prohibition against, first, other available methods for countering the harm
that marihuana use presents and, second, the problems caused by marihuana
use, I must conclude that the legislation is inconsistent with the
constitutional guarantee in s. 7 of the Charter.
http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/rec/html/2003scc074.wpd.htmlAs for the future.... don't worry.... we are stronger than ever, we have the momentum, we have Jack Layton, we have some plans for future stylish rebellion ...... we have just begun to be dignifried.